Countless studies have pointed out that something called “State Shinto (国家神道)” operated deeply in Japan around the time of the Second World War. Yet what State Shinto actually was, whether it truly existed, and whether it exerted nationwide influence on the Japanese people remain unproven. In fact, my own investigation suggests that the Japanese of the period did not worship State Shinto at all; it was at most a highly limited phenomenon and certainly not synonymous with the entirety of modern Japan’s religious policy. The difficulty of grasping State Shinto lies in the fact that Shinto itself was radically transformed by modernization and relaunched amid intense turmoil. Discussing this is no easy task, but to begin, let us look at the modern reorganization of the Shinto system, one of the crucial elements.
In 1868 the Meiji Restoration overthrew the Tokugawa shogunate (徳川幕府), which had ruled for roughly 260 years, and built a modern nation‑state led principally by figures from Chōshū (長州, today’s Yamaguchi Prefecture). It is a fact that this new government made Shinto the ideological foundation of governance in order to sweep away Edo‑period institutions. The background is extremely complex, but a distinctive feature was the reform program centered on Ise Jingū (伊勢神宮). Today the inner shrine of Ise, situated in Mie Prefecture, is regarded as Shinto’s supreme sanctuary, yet historically it had never held such absolute status. A major turning point came with 「太政官布告第234号」(Grand Council of State Edict No. 234) in May 1871, which declared: “Shrine rites are national rites and must not be privately owned by particular individuals or lineages.” This was the policy I have treated several times in Shitsurae: the abolition of hereditary shrine succession and a push for national integration.
This point can be hard to grasp for readers, but historically Shinto shrines were managed hereditarily by specific clans; at large shrines, offices such as chief priest (dai‑gūji, 大宮司) and ritual overseer were distributed among lineages that served generation after generation. Their legitimacy basically derived from the myths and legends in the Kojiki (古事記, 712) and Nihon Shoki (日本書紀, 720). Because each shrine enshrined a deity and, separately, priests who served that deity, the priests occupied the latter position. Where hereditary control survived, local people continued place‑based faiths and did not merge into the new, unified entity called the Japanese nation. Without eliminating those local bonds the Meiji government, which wanted to forge a homogeneous nation, raise a modern army, and counter expanding Western powers in East Asia, could not fulfill its plan. Therefore it unilaterally abolished hereditary rule, hollowed out shrine structures, and re‑organized community life under a centralized regime.
The prime target at the time was Ise Jingū. Even today its two parts are called the Inner Shrine, Kōtai Jingū or Naikū (皇大神宮/内宮), and the Outer Shrine, Toyouke Daijingū or Gekū (豊受大神宮/外宮). The hereditary service of the Arakida (荒木田氏) and Watarai (度会氏) families, who had served Ise for centuries, was abolished. The posts of dai‑gūji were dismantled, and the positions were filled instead by bureaucrats appointed by the Meiji government—an overlooked point when examining wartime State Shinto. In other words, this was state bureaucratic control of religion, and thereafter most shrines were staffed by officials rather than hereditary priests. Here lies the origin of many distortions and complexities.
In January 1871 the incumbent saishu (祭主), Fujinami Noritada (藤波教忠, 1823–1891) from the Fujinami family, was dismissed, and Konoe Tadafusa (近衛忠房, 1838-1873), a court noble deeply tied to the Satsuma domain, was installed as the new saishu. In July of the same year the government appointed Kitakōji Yorimitsu (北小路随光, 1832–1916) dai‑gūji, and the priests of both Naikū and Gekū were simultaneously replaced with bureaucrats selected by the Jingikan (神祇官), a national agency. As a result, operational authority shifted from hereditary priests to the state‑run Jingu Administration Office (神宮司庁), bringing an end to traditional self‑management. The reform devastated ritual administration: every ceremony henceforth had to be performed according to state‑prescribed norms, for the new appointees had no faith in Shinto and no personal ties to Ise—they were outsiders. Bureaucratic regulations thus penetrated shrine faith itself and eroded the place‑rooted beliefs nurtured by the Japanese over centuries. Consequently Ise Jingū survived only under the modern state, and its priests acquired a bureaucratic character. This is the kernel of State Shinto.
Naturally these officials lacked knowledge of Shinto history or belief, and their appointments served nothing but personal career advancement. Behind the expulsion of the Arakida (hereditary priests of Naikū) and Watarai (hereditary priests of Gekū) lay historical and political factors. After the medieval court declined, Ise faith was supported by local lords and commoners, freeing the shrine from Kyoto’s influence and allowing it to develop independently; in this context Gekū thrived. Complicating matters, evidence suggests that Gekū may actually predate Naikū, which was later moved to its present site. Yet Naikū, enshrining the imperial ancestor Amaterasu (天照大御神), long enjoyed higher prestige, a view fiercely challenged by the Watarai serving Gekū.
The Watarai systematized a teaching later called “Ise Shinto” and, through the doctrine of Nikū-ikkō (二宮一光, “two shrines, one radiance”), won enormous influence. By asserting the equality and unity of Naikū and Gekū, they sought to pull back authority concentrated in Naikū and elevate Gekū’s status, triggering major changes among ordinary people in the Ise region. Behind this lay the belief that Toyouke (豊受大神), the deity of agriculture enshrined at Gekū and perceived as a kami of abundant harvests, was far more important to farmers than Amaterasu. Thus a trend arose that esteemed Toyouke (Gekū) above the imperial ancestor Amaterasu (Naikū); indeed during the Edo period the number of priests attached to Gekū was double that of Naikū, Gekū led the boom in Ise pilgrimages, and it held economic superiority—circumstances the new government found troublesome.
The reason is that Chōshū politicians and officials who held power in the new government had toppled the Tokugawa shogunate by military coup and had publicly brandished “reverence for the emperor” as their banner. It was common knowledge among them that the Tokugawa house and certain clans were obstacles to imperial rule. Whether they truly worshiped the emperor is debatable, but to construct a modern nation‑state with the emperor at its apex, they had to absolutize the authority of Amaterasu (Naikū), the emperor’s ancestral deity. That was the new government’s first goal.
To be continued.